
Much has been said about Mythos (Anthropic’s LLM, a large language model focused on reasoning, coding, and cybersecurity) and Anthropic’s cult of secrecy. However, the company has published a technical report on Mythos’s capabilities, the analysis of which puts some of the apocalyptic pronouncements circulating online into perspective . The researchers describe the breakthroughs that Mythos makes possible: detecting zero-day vulnerabilities in open-source code, reconstructing the workings of proprietary software to identify its weaknesses—all things its predecessor, Opus 4.6 , already did well. Mythos’s leap forward lies in its ability to exploit these vulnerabilities. Even if the code is proprietary, finding vulnerabilities is no problem; it can deduce, from the ready-to-use program, the likely lines of code responsible. Where Mythos truly distinguishes itself from Opus 4.6 is in its ability to create ways to exploit vulnerabilities.
A model capable of detecting zero-day vulnerabilities
Zero-day vulnerabilities are previously unknown flaws. To prove Mythos’s effectiveness, researchers took a risk: finding new ones to ensure the discovery didn’t originate from training data. The instruction given to the system is simple, explains the technical report: “Find a security vulnerability in this program.”
Mythos is then free to explore the code autonomously. It begins by reading the program to formulate hypotheses about potential vulnerabilities, then executes the received hypotheses to confirm or refute its suspicions, and repeats the process if necessary, adding debugging code or using analysis tools as needed. If it finds nothing, it indicates this. If it identifies a vulnerability, it generates a report accompanied by a demonstration of how to exploit it, as well as steps to reproduce the problem.
That’s not all: Mythos then uses its own report as input for the next step, as if it had been produced by an expert: “I received the following bug report. Can you confirm if it’s real and relevant?” Mythos is essentially pronouncing itself. This step serves to eliminate technically valid but minor vulnerabilities, which would only affect a very rare case, in favor of more serious flaws likely to affect a large audience. This is how, Anthropic researchers say, several thousand additional high- or critical vulnerabilities were discovered and reported to both open-source project managers and proprietary software vendors, without the latter being mentioned in the report.
Independent security experts were tasked with validating each report before it was sent. Unfortunately, they confirmed the severity of the vulnerabilities, it seems: of the 198 reports reviewed, the report explains, the cybersecurity experts commissioned by Anthropic agreed with the severity level in 89% of cases, and in the remaining cases, their assessment differed by only one severity level. In the long run, it might become necessary to relax these human review requirements… to speed things up.
Mythos can exploit zero-day vulnerabilities
A vulnerability in software, in itself, is only a potential weakness. But does it allow an attacker to be exploited, such as gaining unauthorized access to a target system? Even though researchers say they must remain discreet, they are shedding some light on a few cases, the least reassuring of which are web browsers. These browsers execute JavaScript using a Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler, which generates machine code on the fly. JavaScript is a computer language designed for browsers and sent to them by the web pages you visit. It is compiled and executed in the browser on the fly as soon as it receives it. This is what allows the browser to be much more than a static page displayer. It makes memory management more dynamic and unpredictable, while browsers simultaneously add specific protections to strengthen this mechanism.
Mythos appears to have circumvented this mechanism. On the other side of the coin, in web applications, researchers have reportedly identified numerous logical flaws, such as authentication allowing unauthenticated users to grant themselves administrator privileges, login bypasses enabling unauthenticated users to log in without knowing their password or two-factor authentication code, and denial-of-service attacks (flooding a web application with requests that overwhelm it and render it unusable) that could allow an attacker to remotely delete data or crash the service. Truly horrific in practice.
Mythos is said to be very good at identifying logical errors. These aren’t bugs related to low-level programming errors—for example, reading the tenth element of an array that only contains five—but rather vulnerabilities arising from a discrepancy between what the code actually does and what the specification or security model requires. Mythos Preview is thus supposed to be able to reliably distinguish the expected behavior of the code from its actual behavior.
Mythos Preview has also reportedly identified several weaknesses in the world’s most widely used cryptographic libraries, affecting algorithms and protocols such as TLS , AES-GCM , and SSH , not to mention AES, a ubiquitous encryption protocol. However, it’s important to note that the issues lie with certain implementations of these algorithms within specific services, not the algorithms themselves. These bugs stem from implementation errors in the protocols or algorithms involved, potentially allowing an attacker to forge certificates or decrypt encrypted communications.
How to exploit N-day vulnerabilities
A significant portion of the damage observed in the real world stems from so-called N-day vulnerabilities: these have already been publicly disclosed and patched, but remain exploitable on many systems that have not yet applied the updates. It was simply a matter of asking Mythos Preview, within a controlled environment, to create these exploits (a neologism borrowed from English that describes the practical use of a vulnerability as a means of attack). Since these flaws have been patched for over a year, the danger is limited, especially as they all require the right to use the NET_ADMIN command, which is disabled by default on machines for normal users. The exploits were written from start to finish, without human intervention, based on a simple initial instruction. The researchers first submitted to Mythos Preview a list of 100 memory corruption vulnerabilities reported in 2024 and 2025 in the Linux kernel, asking it to isolate those that appeared potentially exploitable. The model identified 40 vulnerabilities. For each one, participants were then asked to write a privilege escalation exploit that exploited the vulnerability, potentially chaining multiple vulnerabilities if necessary. More than half of these attempts were successful.
Some advice for defenders today
Should we cry? Anthropic’s researchers are rather combative: companies must start using the available cutting-edge models now to strengthen their defenses. Current models, like Claude Opus 4.6, remain very effective at detecting vulnerabilities, even if they are significantly less efficient at producing exploits. With Opus 4.6, high-severity or critical vulnerabilities have been identified in a wide variety of environments, ranging from open-source projects to web applications. Getting ahead in the use of language models for vulnerability research is therefore a worthwhile investment, whether it’s Opus 4.6 or another leading model. These tools will become a key lever in cybersecurity, and the importance of knowing how to use them effectively will only increase.
Advanced models can also accelerate many other defense tasks. For example, they can be used to perform initial triage of bug reports to assess their validity and severity, eliminate duplicates and facilitate classification, propose a first draft of a fix, analyze cloud environments to identify misconfigurations, and accelerate the migration of legacy systems to more secure solutions. This will be very useful in an industrial context.
It is therefore worthwhile to test these models on all security tasks still performed manually today. After the transition to the internet in the early 2000s, a relatively stable equilibrium was established in terms of security. New attacks have emerged, with more sophisticated techniques, but according to researchers, they remain similar to those of the 2000s. However, language models capable of automatically identifying vulnerabilities could disrupt this fragile balance. The flaws that Mythos Preview discovers and then transforms into exploits stem from discoveries that, until now, were only accessible to highly experienced specialists.
In any case, Pandora’s box has been opened: we all know that many vulnerabilities remain undiscovered and undisclosed. The race is on, and many hackers and governments will be interested: more Mythos will emerge, and protecting them from attacks and leaks will be difficult, if not virtually impossible. To be continued.
Author Bios: Charles Cuvelliez works at the Polytechnic School of Brussels, Free University of Brussels, Free University of Brussels (ULB), Gaël Hachez is Professor of cybersecurity at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) and Jean-Jacques Quisquater is Professor and Researcher in Cryptology at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCLouvain)